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Critical Perspectives on Intervention 
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INTRODUCTION 
 I am honored to be invited to this discussion. 
 Our current inquiry about intervention must start with the global 
community. It is a community in its comprehensive empirical, factual 
linkages and intersecting processes among all states and peoples of 
the world. We can only affirm that we are now living in McLuhan’s 
Global Village of simultaneous communications and claims to 
norms.1 
 This globalization is necessary context for familiar debates about 
global governance, for example, whether state consent must serve as 
its basis, or whether it can only be defined through a globally 
centralized command structure, etc. 
 But other necessary questions from the global context also arise. 
The intense actual and value linked processes defining the global 
community present us, as McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman began 
to discuss a half century ago, with the inescapable responsibility of 
identifying the constitutive process of this community.2 That is, the 
 
† Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law, Temple University. I appreciate 
the excellent research assistance of Ms. Nicole Leach, JD expected 2015, and the 
earlier background research of Ms. Laura Cook, JD 2013. All errors remain my 
own. 
1. See THOMAS R. MCFAUL, THE FUTURE OF PEACE AND JUSTICE IN THE 
GLOBAL VILLAGE 3–14 (2006) (discussing McLuhan’s image of the “global 
village” and the transforming effects of globalization). 
2. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND 
INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 72–77, 112–33 (2010) (discussing the increasingly 
globalized nature of international affairs and constitutive structures for the 
enforcement of international norms). 
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flow of decisions, which establishes, maintains, adjusts, and changes 
the institutions and procedures by which all other decisions are taken. 
On this basis, actors in processes of more specific decisions allocate 
basic values—such as power, wealth, rights, loyalties, and 
authority—and the access to global resources.3   
 In this regard, in any human community, there is always 
“governance,” though it may well rest on patterns of Hobbesian 
banditry and Machiavellian contingency in unfamiliar, non-
institutionalized arrangements. As scholars, we have the 
responsibility to identify and understand this global constitutive 
process. And in exercising this responsibility, we confront a major 
question about the current law of the global community, because 
there will inevitably be Law in the sense of constitutive decisions as 
noted above. 
 The major continuing question for international law in our 
Global Village is whether, as a dynamic legal process of authority 
and control, it will in its decisions, interpretations, and large range of 
actors simply reflect the dominant patterns of power and control that 
arise from unappraised sources in the Village. Or, whether its 
decisions and interpretations will normatively aim to steadily shape a 
better global community towards greater sharing of human values, 
more protection of personal rights, less conflict, and more 
cooperation towards human dignity. This jurisprudential question 
continues today to be one of great tension and great camouflage.4 
 But this question underpins our discussion today on intervention 
under international law: whether international law will simply bless 
existing intervention patterns of global power and practice, unilateral 
or collectively authorized, or whether as a legal system it will define 
norms to meet the responsibility under Article 13(1) of the UN 
Charter of fostering truly “the progressive development of 
 
3. Id. at 112–13. 
4. Competing jurisprudential and intellectual approaches proposing best ways 
to understand international law and international relations reflect these tensions and 
provide frameworks for much of the camouflage. How a jurisprudential school—
from positivism through realism, through natural law, through sociological realism, 
through feminist jurisprudence, through critical race theory and TWAIL, through 
constructivism—does or does not, for example, give authority and relevance to 
evidence of human rights violations regarding Rights Accountability under 
international law of states or private parties is only one of numerous possible 
examples of such tension and camouflage.   
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international law.”5 
 An inescapable inquiry arising from this constitutive question is 
whether regarding intervention—however we define it—international 
law has ceased to reflect and bless the raw patterns of power, 
domination, subordination, and race that it did structure and bless for 
some four centuries, prior to confirming the formal illegality of 
European and other colonialism in the mid-twentieth century. 
Anthony Anghie and other scholars have shown that colonial aims 
and doctrines persist, to the point where current international law at 
the constitutive level continues to be racialized as between Northern 
Tier peoples and states pursuing various versions of an imperial 
project, and racialized “other” peoples and states in the Southern 
Tier, and also towards such diasporic peoples in the Northern Tier 
within the North’s own territories and cities.6 
 Colonial conquest, its mobilization of law and institutions to 
serve dominating policies, and its permitted military force to conquer 
and induce Southern peoples and leaders under the tent of empires, 
represent the first pertinent global model of intervention, a model of 
manipulated and purposeful penetration of foreign peoples and their 
cultures, backed by military force and rationalized subordination. 
These were the global precedents and strategies that fixed the claims 
to authority to intervene, as a global dynamic moving from the 
Northern Tier to and against Southern peoples. Today, there is a 
heavy burden on all who would argue that this colonial dynamic in 
international law has become so neutralized and equitable as to no 
longer shape meaningful North/South narratives and analysis about 
authoritative interveners and strategies.  
 Further, in this necessarily contextual Introduction, the presence 
or absence of international law is not a pertinent jurisprudential 
question in critical discussions of intervention. As I noted, some 
constitutive process of international law and governance—whether or 
not in Westphalian form—will always exist in the Global Village. 
 
5. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1. 
6. See ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 268–69 (2005) (arguing that non-Western countries are held 
up to Western experiences and norms and then subjected to international law that 
promotes and safeguards Western interests). 
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Our question is: for what constitutive and policy ends is this law to be 
shaped? Included here is the necessary question of how authority, 
jurisprudence, and process are to be globally allocated, regarding 
decisions and influence about the formation of international law on 
intervention-related issues.7 Whoever controls or strongly affects the 
jurisprudence of international law formation does so as well for the 
major allocations of legal authority and justice in the Global Village, 
including under progressive interpretations of the UN Charter. 
 Let us also note here that under the Charter the use of military 
force is conventionally authorized only by Article 51 on self-defense, 
and by the collective authority of the Security Council, the latter 
being the principal legal avenue for many significant military 
interventions. But we must also note the Charter’s reaffirmation of 
the constitutive doctrine of sovereign equality of states, and its legal 
significance for the decolonization movement, to be discussed 
herein.8 We must further note, regarding state intentions at its San 
Francisco negotiating conference, the opposition of Western states 
led by the United States to making clear in its text that the Charter 
outlawed colonialism and racism against colonized peoples, leaving 
the confirmation of these prohibitions to emerge later under 
 
7. An example here of this tension—and thus, certification of the importance 
of the question—is the 60 year old contested global narrative generally between 
Northern and Southern Hemispheric States on whether the UN General Assembly 
through its resolutions should be understood as an arena for the formation of 
international law. The narrative was framed by the newly-sovereign states from the 
decolonization movement, which was quickly established in the 1960s as an 
assembly voting majority dedicated to renovating post-colonial international law to 
support, or at least not exclude, third and fourth world constitutive interests. See 
Michael Barnett, The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical 
Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 79, 84 (1995) 
(discussing the UN’s decolonization agenda). Key early battles centered on 
jurisdictional doctrines and the legal authority of the norm of Permanent 
Sovereignty over National Resources and the Assembly’s subsequent Charter on 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. See generally G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. 
Doc. A/1803(XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962); G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. 
A/3281(XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974). The obvious importance of the contested 
jurisprudence around this narrative goes to, inter alia, whether Southern 
Hemisphere States will have a pathway to leverage important contributions to the 
formation of international law, as do Northern hemispheric States (especially the P-
5) through their control of the UN Security Council operating under Article 25 of 
the Charter. Tensions around this narrative continue today in various forms. 
8. See infra Parts II, III. 
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international law.9 And finally, what homage should be paid the 
Charter’s domestic jurisdiction clause, which was so abused by South 
Africa to protect apartheid and by France to preserve colonial 
dominion over Algeria, until better legal interpretation prevailed?10 
 Additionally, we note proposed Charter interpretations allowing 
the unilateral use of force for “humanitarian intervention” as a 
permissive principle of customary international law. This doctrinal 
claim had both pre- and post-Charter history in supporting Northern 
arguments to intervene in Southern States to rescue the former’s 
citizens threatened there with harm. This doctrine has been much 
abused, including in the definition of “citizens” expanding to 
“European kith and kin” as empowering rescue interventions by any 
European state, and incorporating the general practice of invoking the 
doctrine for supposed rescue missions while the intervening troops, 
once in country, tended to also modify the local governance of the 
state more towards European interests.11 All in all, this history frames 
 
9. HENRY J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTERESTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xxxiii, xxxviii–xl (2008). 
10. South Africa’s consistent invocation of its freedom from international 
scrutiny of apartheid in the 1950s and 1960s under the Charter’s domestic 
jurisdiction provision is well known, as is the ultimate global community reactive 
legal interpretation, which removed systematic violations of human rights from 
matters essentially under a State’s domestic jurisdiction. See Kevin Hopkins, 
Assessing the World's Response to Apartheid: A Historical Account of International 
Law and Its Part in the South African Transformation, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. 
L. REV. 241, 250–54 (2002) (discussing South Africa’s attempts to evade 
international pressure in regard to apartheid, and the UN’s, response). Perhaps less 
well known is France’s attempt during the Algerian War to completely foreclose 
the questions of both colonial conquest and domestic jurisdiction and international 
scrutiny of its treatment of Algerians by amending its national constitution to make 
Algerian a department and thus an integral part of its metropolitan territory. See 
Cybelle H. McFadden, Franco-Algerian Transcultural Tension and National 
Allegories, 74 S. ATLANTIC REV. 112, 114, 114 n.5 (2009) (discussing Algeria’s 
unique colonial position as a department of France). 
11. European interventions in the Congo (including re Katanga) and the 1986 
U.S. intervention in Libya are two instances. See generally Janeen Klinger, 
Stabilization Operations and Nation-Building: Lessons from United Nations 
Peacekeeping in the Congo, 1960-1964, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 83, 87–93 
(2005) (discussing the Congo Crisis and Belgium and the United Nations’ 
intervention in that country); Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of 
Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L 177, 179–80, 
189–92 (1987) (discussing the United States’ 1986 bombing campaign against 
2014]    CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION 17 
a significant question on intervention. It concerns the conventional 
interpretation of the Charter that it changed international law by 
restricting the use of unilateral force only to self defense (now 
including anticipatory self defense under Caroline Case limitations) 
and the use of force otherwise only to Security Council 
authorization.12 The question is, what, if any, acceptable international 
legal and policy basis can be claimed to add additional permissions 
under the Charter to legalize further unilateral state uses of military 
force for any kind of intervention? 
 Lastly, we know that “intervention” is an ambiguous legal term. 
Especially in the Global Village, there are many diplomatic, 
ideological, cybertechnic, economic, para-military, and military 
strategies of various intensities.13 Indeed, the very notion of 
“intervention” calls for an interrogation of the authority and 
sovereignty of the State beyond the limits of this Lecture. I will 
discuss some of these intervention strategies, for example relating to 
human rights, while others, such as Northern policies of nation-
building and of premature recognition of governments, or non-
military violations of Article 2(4) of the Charter, will be omitted. And 
I will discuss military intervention: when deployed it threatens the 
widest range of immediate damage to human rights and values; but 
occasionally, unfortunately, its proper deployment is necessary as an 
initial strategy to prevent or mitigate an impending human 
catastrophe. As will be discussed, the procedures, aims, and legal 
authority for such deployment are as important as the military action 
and its consequences. 
 From this Introduction, I will now briefly address the following 
questions regarding intervention: the power of human rights; 
American Interventions against Southern democracies and the 
 
Libya, the international response to that bombing, and America’s claimed 
justification of self-defense). 
12. See John Moore, The Caroline, in 3 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2419, 2420–21 (1906); James Dever & John P. Dever Jr., Making Waves: Refitting 
the Caroline Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165, 
166–67 (2013). 
13. See W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling 
Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 794, 803–05 (1995) (discussing economic 
sanctions and unilateral intervention as a tools to preserve vulnerable democracies). 
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importance of the Nicaragua case;14 the critical importance of the 
global decolonization movement, and its insufficiency to prevent the 
march of colonial aims into post-colonial international law; counter-
terrorism, global policy, failed states, and intervention as claimed 
self-defense; the UN Security Council as an international lawgiver, 
the need to interrogate its decision process as a bulwark of Northern 
racializing of law, and its authority over regional organizations; the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P);15 and a final proposal addressing the 
issue of R2P and unilateral military intervention. 
I.      THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 The rise of international human rights law produced an 
international legal obligation on states and others to protect the rights 
of individuals amidst their conduct of international relations and 
amidst their relations with their own people within their own 
territories.16 
 For the first time, a duty on states emerged directly under 
international law to protect individuals’ human rights, amidst even 
the most intense state claims of traditional sovereign initiatives and 
prerogatives. This duty supports, inter alia, a general international 
obligation to look inside of each state regarding the protection of its 
peoples’ rights, a duty for all states towards all peoples, and at a 
minimum a duty to report and expose significant threats from that 
host state to the rights of peoples within its borders. 
 But as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL 
II) scholars note, this duty demands two further interrogations: (1) of 
the authoritarian conditions within the post-colonial Northern and 
Southern states; and (2) of the abuse by Northern states of this duty to 
protect human rights abroad, by carrying forward proto-colonial 
“civilizing” goals to “save” those peoples from themselves, even by 
 
14. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
15. The emerging doctrine of R2P is more fully discussed herein in connection 
with Security Council authority. See infra Part VI. 
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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use of military force to intervene and control those governments.17 
 The principle of protecting individual human rights is now 
obligatory.  It must now be invoked by States and non-state actors in 
a variety of situations. Thus, basic issues of human decency and harm 
to persons must be addressed in the Global Village through all of its 
intersecting value processes. Among the international actors 
obligated to invoke the human rights protection of people in 
particular situations are those states, the majority in the Northern Tier 
which are most equipped to intervene in Southern States by 
diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military means, and thus now 
must at least be seen to implement their national policies under their 
human rights obligations. Hence, this is the new power of human 
rights regarding intervention in foreign (Southern) states. 
II. AMERICAN INTERVENTIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN DEMOCRACIES 
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NICARAGUA CASE 
 The sample of Iran, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Chile, and Grenada 
represents democratically elected leaders militarily overthrown by the 
United States and Northern Tier states because of the former’s 
policies on protecting Northern foreign investment profits in their 
countries and because of the perceived insufficiency of their 
responses to U.S. cold war demands. These interventions confirmed 
that Southern national democracy was no safeguard against U.S. and 
Northern military intervention if Washington or its major corporate 
clients disagreed with the content of Southern governments’ policies. 
 These Southern countries were racially “othered” beyond the 
political commonality of democratic government and therefore 
eligible for Northern interventionary control to select local Southern 
leaders suitable to Northern leaders. 
 Thus the United States projected its domestic policies of 
subordination of racial minorities abroad. At home, majority officials 
and law enforcement agencies have consistently monitored minority 
leadership, especially among African Americans, of their own groups 
for majority-“approved” leaders, and discouraged, undermined, or 
 
17. See Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to 
International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. 
INT’L L. 77, 83 (2003) (discussing TWAIL II scholarship’s criticism of 
authoritarianism and emphasis on preserving the rights of Third World peoples). 
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ejected all others, as well as opposed all processes seeking Black 
autonomy in choosing Black leadership.   
 Inter-American reaffirmation of non-intervention doctrine, plus 
Calvo Clause doctrine, plus the notion of economic aggression 
emerged as inter-American counterclaims to hegemonic intervention, 
plus mobilization of regional organizational (Organization of 
American States) legal opposition to actions of U.S. hegemony 
occurred during the twentieth century under the rise of regional non-
intervention doctrine.18 
 The United States and former empire/hegemonic states, 
including Russia, have persistently attempted to construct 
international authority from International Relations theory: namely, 
its support for the historical inevitability of the rise of hegemonic 
states to fill vacuums in regional public order, which they argue and 
demand should be supported by international law as beneficial to 
global governance.19 
A. Nicaragua 
 It is appropriate now to address the 1984 International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) contentious case of Nicaragua v. United States.20 The 
 
18. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 707–08 (6th 
ed. 2003); See David E. Graham, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a 
Contractual Renunciation of Diplomatic Protection, 6 TEX. INT’L L. F. 289, 289–94 
(1971) (discussing the Calvo Clause and Latin American countries’ use of the 
clause to limit intervention by other countries, including the United States); 
Wenhua Shan, From “North-South Divide” to “Private Public Debate”: Revival of 
the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 
27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 631, 631–35 (2007) (discussing the history and 
resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America); Martin Domb, Defining 
Economic Aggression in International Law: The Possibility of Regional Action by 
the Organization of American States, 11 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 85, 85–88 (1978) 
(discussing the concept of economic aggression and several Latin American 
countries’ attempt to prevent such aggression through the Organization of 
American States). 
19. ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN 
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); JEFFERY L. DUNOFF, INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE 
STATE OF THE ART (2013).  
20. Nicaragua, supra note 14. 
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case raises clear issues under classical non-intervention doctrine: the 
unconsented hostile mining of Nicaragua’s harbor by American 
covert forces; and the funding and command of proxy paramilitary 
forces from El Salvador across Nicaraguan borders to oppose its 
government. Our attention is drawn to, first, the international 
relations context of this case, and second, to the theory under 
customary law of the ICJ’s majority opinion which upheld the 
continuing authority of the non-intervention doctrine under 
international law. 
 On the first, with Nicaragua finding a treaty basis to establish 
ICJ jurisdiction over the United States, notwithstanding U.S. counter-
strategies aiming to avoid that result, by consenting to that 
jurisdiction the Court put itself at a stark crossroads at that moment in 
the international community. In facing the massive weight of the 
United States in its undeclared war against Nicaragua on one side, 
and the grounded claims of sovereign equality and authority of the 
non-intervention doctrine by Nicaragua on the other, the ICJ in a 
grand sense, through whatever its jurisprudence and best 
interpretation of international law regarding liability between these 
states, had to choose whether this case should be decided under 
embedded propositions of international relations or under embedded 
doctrines of international law. The international relations case would 
stand on propositions embedded in the field’s general scholarship for 
a few generations. Namely, that this was a clear case of a regional 
hegemonic state moving through its own power, to impose regional 
discipline under its own public order goals against smaller states in 
its own, and globally acknowledged, regional “backyard” or “sphere 
of influence.” The rise of this and other hegemonic states at various 
points in history was necessary to prevent interstate conflict from 
getting out of hand and to impose needed public order in various 
parts of the globe. Thus, not only were there strong factual and 
historical indicators that such hegemonic states periodically emerged 
to exercise their hegemony, but there were normative perspectives 
that argued such organizing and coercing of smaller states as 
beneficial to the global good.   
 For the United States as an Inter-American hegemon, practices 
of its exercising interventionary hegemony in the region for ensuring 
“democracy” and prompt payment of debts stretched back to the first 
half of the nineteenth century, and then forward in new definitions to 
address its perceptions of a socialist government in Nicaragua.  In 
this regard, the international relations propositions pose the challenge 
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to post-World War II, post-colonial international law of whether that 
legal system must find some doctrine and interpretation among its 
sources of authority to bless and legalize the policies and “discipline” 
of the hegemonic state when it chooses to intervene in its own 
backyard. Indeed, this was the basic argument of the United States in 
this case, presented as an assertion of sovereign prerogative to 
intervene regarding both its attempted manipulation of the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction and its subsequent, futile attempt to absent itself from the 
merits proceedings.21 
 But Nicaragua was standing on an ultimately different 
foundation. It rested its case on the UN Charter-reaffirmed principle 
of sovereign equality of states, historically a principle of both 
international relations and international law, and on the doctrine of 
non-intervention as not only reaffirmed in the UN Charter, but 
finding strong underpinnings and legal expressions arising from 
Inter-American states in response to the same hegemonic activities of 
the United States during the previous and present centuries.22 
Reinforced by treaty and regional organization findings and 
declarations in the name of the Americas, the doctrine of non-
intervention in its military expression existed as a living bundle of 
expectations under both regional and general international law, and 
particularly for small states, notwithstanding that they could only 
rarely oppose such US military action when it occurred. 
 Thus, the ICJ faced, as a court of law but functioning in the 
actual world, the decision of whether this case was to be decided 
under international relations (although cloaked in legalisms), or under 
international law. And as we know, it decided upon the latter, thus 
 
21. Id. at 32; United States: Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the 
Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, 24 INT’L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 246, 246 (1985) [hereinafter Statement on the U.S. 
Withdrawal]. 
22. See generally Charter of the Organization of American States art. 2, para. 
b, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. Indeed the decision by Nicaragua 
to sue the United States for illegal intervention in 1984 is an expression of the same 
inter-American opposition to American intervention. See Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Reports of Judgments, 
Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1984 I.C.J. 169, ¶ 32 (May 10) (discussing 
Nicaragua’s claims based on its sovereignty, non-intervention, and the right of self-
determination, among others). 
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incurring the immediate enmity of the legally thwarted United 
States.23 The notion that, when international relations clashes with 
international law on questions of intervention, international law 
should prevail, has clear ramifications for the authority of non-
intervention doctrine in the Global Village.  
 Further, the Court’s holding on non-intervention and customary 
law was, in a different way, equally significant. 
 We see that the International Court of Justice here handed down 
a major decision against hegemonic subordination of small, regional, 
“other” states and peoples, against the U.S. military intervention in 
Nicaragua. Its holding on international law formation was favorable 
to the South: the norm of non-intervention remains good law with 
only general state practice because of community opinio juris.24 
Thus, the notion of the violation of the non-intervention norm was 
preserved, and applied against U.S. military action against Nicaragua. 
The Court, faced with a choice of the claimed international relations 
authority to intervene of a hegemonic state, and the international 
legal authority of the non-intervention norm as well as the norm of 
sovereign equality of states, by legal reasoning which accepted the 
customary law challenge, chose to determine U.S. liability under 
international law. The subsequent anger of the United States and its 
two-year campaign against the Court certified the importance of the 
Nicaragua case.25 
III. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE GLOBAL DECOLONIZATION 
MOVEMENT AND ITS INSUFFICIENCY TO PREVENT THE MARCH OF 
COLONIAL AIMS INTO POST-COLONIAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 This historic Decolonization Movement, coalescing in the 1950s 
 
23. See Theodore M. Lieverman, Law and Power: Some Reflections on 
Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 10 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 
295, 298 n.16 (1986) (discussing the United States’ Security Council veto of 
Nicaragua’s attempt to enforce the ICJ judgment); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., 
Nicaragua v. United States as a Precedent, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 652, 656–57 (1985) 
(noting that the United States attempted to limit the jurisdictional reach of the ICJ 
under different treaties). 
24. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 18. 
25. Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 21, at 246–49 (arguing that 
the Court’s finding of jurisdiction over the matter is “contrary to law and fact” and 
that a judicial tribunal with questionable impartiality is not the proper venue to 
resolve the US-Nicaragua conflict). 
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through the 1970s, changed global politics and international law by 
adding some 140 sovereign states to the international community. It 
further revised the politics and authority of the United Nations and 
other international organizations. In its early post-colonial years, it 
mounted a formidable challenge through the UN General Assembly 
to Northern normative, legal, and economic dominance of the Global 
Village.26 It reaffirmed the need to revise the international legal 
system and its jurisprudence towards the equitable participation of 
smaller states and Southern peoples of color, and it invigorated 
notions of sovereign accountability under international law. 
 Further, the Decolonization Movement challenged Northern 
control and domination of the processes of international law 
formation, including through the UN General Assembly, the 
Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,27 and 
the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States,28 plus the 
rise of a body of Southern Tier-oriented international legal 
scholarship. 
 The Movement represented a convergence of the newly 
confirmed jus cogens right of self-determination of peoples, and the 
doctrine of sovereign equality of states, which had to be applied to all 
of these new states under the UN Charter. This convergence, a 
principal outcome of decolonization, formed the refutation of rights 
claimed by ex-colonial metropolitans and other Northern states to 
 
26. See NASSAU A. ADAMS, WORLDS APART: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 53–55 (1993) (discussing the growing influence of 
post-colonial countries in the General Assembly during the 1950s). 
27. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803(VXII) (Dec. 14, 1962). 
28. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 8281 (XXIX), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281(XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974) (declaring that every State has 
the right to “regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment . . . in 
accordance with national objectives and priorities. No state shall be compelled to 
grant preferential treatment to foreign investment.”); see also Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/1514(XV) (Dec. 14, 1960) (“Immediate steps shall be taken, in 
Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet 
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, 
without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed 
will and desire . . . .”). 
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continue to intervene in their former colonies by economic and 
military strategies. 
 But then came the Northern counter-attack to regain 
jurisprudential and organizational dominance in the Global Village. 
Economic strategies against smaller states were coupled with periodic 
military interventions, such as the periodic French incursions in 
French West Africa and the US intervention in Vietnam under the 
thin guise of the doctrine of collective self-defense (on which the 
Nicaragua case subsequently put important limits).29 In this period 
also arose the general Northern Tier aim to escape international legal 
accountability for the racial, economic, and cultural abuses of 
colonialism and apartheid, and, where possible, to shift any such 
liability to Southern States by holding them strictly responsible for all 
events and misgovernance within their borders, no matter what their 
origins. 
 In this connection, there was the notable refusal of Northern 
Governments to significantly intervene in the South African apartheid 
state and to make it impossible for the UN Security Council to do 
so.30 This Northern refusal to “other” the apartheid state and thus 
privilege its claimed cold war interests to cooperate with Pretoria 
represented a privileging of Northern racial solidarity with white 
South Africa against its Black majority, and implicitly against all 
African heritage peoples in the Global Village. In the United States, it 
took the historic African American-led anti-apartheid movement to 
change U.S. foreign policy to more support the South African anti-
apartheid struggle.31 Gernot Kohler’s important jurisprudential 
proposal—that law and law making in the entire Global Village could 
accurately be reflected as a mirror of South African apartheid—was a 
direct reflection of the inability of  most Northern scholars to 
acknowledge race as a moving force in international relations, even 
 
29. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 32. 
30. See S.C. Res. 581, U.N. Doc. S/RES/581 (Feb. 13, 1986) (condemning the 
apartheid state, but not taking significant steps to intervene). Indeed during the 
1980s, notwithstanding wide international pressure on States to levy economic 
sanctions on South African apartheid government, the UN Security Council was 
only able to enact a single arm embargo against apartheid South Africa in 1977. 
S.C. Res. 418, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977). 
31. Henry J. Richardson III, Reverend Leon Sullivan's Principles, Race, and 
International Law: A Comment, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 55, 67–69 (2001). 
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given the brutal clarity of apartheid.32 It was further a reflection of 
the reasons and consequences of a pattern of confirmed Northern 
decisions to refuse to intervene in apartheid South Africa, while 
being quite willing to do so elsewhere in the Southern Tier, and being 
quite willing to do so, using heavy economic strategies, upon the 
advent of post-apartheid South Africa in 1994.33 
 Thus, the Global Village saw the continuation in modern 
international law of old Northern colonial doctrines: to make political 
concessions on forms of Southern state independence, while 
continuing economic and periodic military intervention strategies, 
and arguing their legality so as to leverage Southern states from 
within their national territories and within their governments for the 
benefit of Northern interests. 
IV. COUNTER-TERRORISM GLOBAL POLICY, FAILED STATES, AND 
INTERVENTION AS CLAIMED SELF-DEFENSE 
There appears to be a current U.S. policy of mobilizing all 
national African militaries, plus African Union (AU) regional 
authorized forces, to U.S. counter-terrorism aims.34 This is a new 
kind of great power intervention, with induced consent of Southern 
states, under potential self-defense claims that descend on thin 
grounds from the Global Village’s post-9/11 gift to the United States 
of a valid self-defense claim in inaugurating the Afghanistan war, a 
gift subsequently undermined by the 2003 Iraq invasion. Thus, issues 
of whether counter-terrorism overseas military strategies rest on 
“self-defense” or “police enforcement” rationales may be somewhat 
beside the point. Both seem to lead to attempts to legalize foreign 
Northern pre-emptive military interventions into the South, while 
failing so far to halt the now-dispersed threat of global terrorism as 
 
32. See Gernot Kohler, The Three Meanings of Global Apartheid: Empirical, 
Normative, Existential, 20 ALTERNATIVES 403, 403–05 (1995) (discussing the 
impact of race in our society). 
33. Hopkins, supra note 10, at 250; African National Congress [ANC], 
Economic Transformation, 53d Nat’l Conference Resolutions, ANC Decl. 3 at 20 
(Dec. 16–20, 2012). 
34. See generally AFRICOM, THE REPORTER , no. 4, 2011 at 193 (describing 
the role of Air Force Judge Advocates in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in 
Africa). 
2014]    CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION 27 
attacks on innocent civilians.35 
 Further, there is the closely related question of whether unilateral 
interventions into “failed states” will be legalized, as interventions 
into the “renamed racial others.” Ruth Gordon has discussed the early 
twenty-first century proposed and demanded revitalization of the UN 
Trusteeship Council to be the global legal repository of de-
sovereigntized “failed states,” plus the demand to resolve the 
transitional international legal questions to make this happen, as “The 
Ultimate Intervention.”36 However, international legal doctrine, 
despite many Northern scholarly proposals that it as a legal system 
should do so, and despite disputed arguments that U.S. counter-
terrorism policy may validly claim prerogatives of military 
intervention into failed states to preempt sources of terrorist threats, 
has not incorporated these demands and policy goals.  It has 
particularly refused to incorporate a formally reduced standard of 
sovereignty for  “failed states” that would permit greater military 
intervention into their territories under any notion of reduced 
sovereignty. The International Court of Justice made this clear in its 
holding in the Congo v. Uganda37 case regarding Uganda’s lack of 
special cross-border interventionary prerogatives into the Congo, 
notwithstanding the latter’s indexed status as a failed state.38 In the 
same vein, other judicial holdings have refused to lower the threshold 
of state responsibility. For example, Somalia as a failed state did not 
mitigate foreign criminal penalties for pirates sailing from its 
territory.39 
 
35. See Bill Briggs, Study: US Drone Strikes More Likely to Kill Civilians 
Than US Jet Fire, NBC NEWS (July 2, 2013, 8:34 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/ 
investigations/study-us-drone-strikes-more-likely-kill-civilians-us-jet-v19254842  
(discussing the impact of airstrikes for counterterrorism purposes). 
36. Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903, 904–07 (1997). 
37. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19). 
38. Id. ¶ 259. 
39. "[P]iracy should never be the solution to a people operating in a failed state 
as it inflicts and continues to inflict pain and suffering onto humanity in different 
ways, a fact of which the accused are well aware.” R v Ise (2011) SLR 220 at ¶3 
(Syc.). We may interpret this part of the holding further as prohibiting the use or 
support by a failed (African) state of piracy and its activities because of their harm 
to humanity, under historically grounded law, and thus its citizens can claim no 
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 This international legal refusal to diminish the sovereignty of 
“failed states” in the face of heavy Northern official and scholarly 
demands that they be subject to forms of preemptive intervention, not 
limited by requirements to find “imminent danger’ to invading states, 
represents the more desirable legal policy. It holds the line against 
further racializing of international legal approaches to failed states, 
when the very concept represents great racializing. And in doing so, 
as Jeremy Levitt discusses, it preserves space for the continued 
evolution of regional doctrines of obligations to assist failed states to 
resolve their problems, while prescribing obligations and rights 
protecting peoples within those states.40 Such examples arise in 
Africa under the African Union Treaty prescribing rights of 
democratic governance, of freedom from military coups, and rights to 
remedial regional assistance.41 Regional policies are prescribed of 
assistance for “collapsed states,” plus regional approval and 
authorization of military intervention into regional situations of 
human rights catastrophe, such as Nigeria into Sierra Leone and 
Liberia under the Economic Community of West African States 
 
defense or mitigation for such activities, no matter what their personal or needful 
circumstances. There is no ‘failed state’ privilege to impose piracy costs on the 
international community. The Court’s holding continued, and directly implied that 
the Seychelles as a sovereign state may exercise its protective jurisdiction against 
such threatening actions in the Indian Ocean to protect its vital interests, as it is 
doing here. Citizens of ‘failed states’ have no grounds for, nor do they deserve a 
waiver of liability when acts from their territory create a threat to other states. By 
the Court upholding criminal sentences beyond the minimum all around in this 
case, it implicitly held that African ‘failed states’ retain full sovereign 
responsibility for actions emanating from their territory, and their citizens, no 
matter their personal hardships, retain full international criminal liability for their 
actions, especially as these personal and territorial actions are shown to threaten the 
vital interests of a neighboring state. 
40. See JEREMY I. LEVITT, ILLEGAL PEACE IN AFRICA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
LEGALITY OF POWER SHARING WITH WARLORDS, REBELS, AND JUNTA 145–48 
(2012) (discussing the UN Charter’s recognition of broad rights and protections, 
including self-determination, and how certain power agreements in Africa have so 
far failed to meet these standards). 
41. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance art. 4–5, 23–24, 
Jan. 30, 2007, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_CHARTER_ON_ 
DEMOCRACY_ELECTIONS_AND_GOVERNANCE.pdf. 
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(ECOWAS) Treaty.42 
V.    THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAWGIVER: 
THE NEED TO INTERROGATE ITS DECISION PROCESS AS A 
BULWARK OF NORTHERN RACIAL AUTHORITY 
 Much current scholarship on the legality of the use of force to 
intervene in states where human rights are threatened, where 
international crimes are being committed, or to bring “democracy” 
for wider regional or geopolitical purposes, is focused on the UN 
Security Council, as both a law-giver and as the preferred legal arena 
for these proposed actions.43 Many interim issues are raised, 
including threatened Council inaction in the face of widely agreed 
and credibly documented international crimes, for example Syria, and 
chemical weapons, and thousands of deaths, but for the moment let 
us put them aside. 
 The point is that the argued heightened legal necessity of 
Security Council approval throws an intense spotlight on the need for 
a new normative assessment of Security Council decision making, 
beyond an analysis of its Charter and other authority, as essential to 
understanding current military interventions under international law. 
This need is framed, on the one hand, by the asserted role of the 
Council as the chief custodian of collective authority under 
international law and the most desirable source of legal permission to 
use force, and on the other hand, by the total lack of global 
momentum towards any Security Council reform that would revise 
the procedures by which it as a Charter body decides to allocate 
authority to member states and prescribe interpretations of 
international law. We are left, therefore, with the current narratives of 
Council decision making, especially under Chapter VII authority, that 
feature a domination/subordination two tier system of P-5 
collaboration and debates to resolve veto/abstention questions in that 
group, from which the rotating Council members are generally 
excluded. There follows the polling and assembling of a Council 
voting majority which often features applications of varying 
 
42. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States art. 58, May, 
28, 1975, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/?id=treaty&lang=en. 
43. See generally Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary 
Security Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills? 59 STAN. L. REV. 415, 419–20 (2006) 
(arguing that the UN Security Council is well-suited to address modern 
international threats of force). 
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pressures by individual or several P-5 members on smaller, more 
vulnerable rotating members to construct a voting majority for the 
proposed Council decision.44   
 I suggest that this decision narrative can no longer be accepted 
as a legally permissible and excusable exercise of Northern sovereign 
autonomy and cross-pressures within the Council arena. This 
narrative falls under the classic Groatian axiom that we must not fail 
to normatively assess every significant act of international relations. 
 In assessing the Council’s decision process, we note certain 
continuing issues. We note the original Charter intent that the P-5, 
emerging as governmental directors of the world community out of 
World War II and also as declining metropolitans of threatened 
empires, would cast their Council vetoes only on the sincere belief 
that a particular resolution would significantly imperil the global 
community welfare.45 We do so, only to then note that fairly early on, 
this hope and the original Charter intent was dashed, first by the 
Soviet Union and soon after by the United States, by establishing 
precedents in which vetoes were cast to do nothing more than protect 
their exclusive foreign policy interests and allies.   
 As Kenneth Roth recently observed regarding Syria, “One 
frustrating element of the Security Council’s structure is that it 
permits the Five Permanent Members to use their vetoes to block 
action for any reason, partisan or parochial, even in the case of mass 
atrocities.”46 And thus there subsequently arise short-lived debates 
about whether the use of the veto can be limited under the law of the 
Charter, ending in negative futility from P-5 refusals and barriers. For 
example, recently in the current UN narrative refining the R2P 
principle, the Secretary-General urged the P-5 to publicly and 
 
44. Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 27, 53, 55 (2003). 
45. 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 927–933 
(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
46. Kenneth Roth, Syria: What Chance to Stop the Slaughter?, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Nov. 21, 2013, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013 
/nov/21/syria-what-chance-stop-slaughter/. 
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voluntarily commit to refrain from casting vetoes of any Chapter VII 
resolution authorizing R2P intervention for credible, well-grounded 
reasons.47 That recommendation is still pending.48 
 A second continuing issue is that of the limits of Security 
Council legal authority. We are all familiar with the Lockerbie 
Case,49 which gave the ICJ the opportunity to rule on this issue, 
which it promptly deflected.50 A longer strand of argument holds that 
Council authority is necessarily limited by the Charter Articles 1 and 
2, Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. This argument has 
never been either refuted or confirmed, due to the wide constitutive 
text of those Articles, as well as the proposition that while the 
argument could be ultimately valid, the Council has not yet been 
perceived to act at the limits of whatever authority Articles 1 & 2 
might represent. More might be done on this question, given the right 
opportunity, for a Southern Tier actor (most likely) to actually and 
concretely frame an argument of Council ultra vires by action or 
inaction in a particular situation violating Articles 1 & 2, but this has 
not yet happened. 
 But these issues do not comprise a normative assessment of the 
Council’s decision making in exercising collective authority to 
authorize R2P or other military intervention, in particular states, 
which are most likely located in the Southern Tier. We must focus on 
the question of the corruption of the Council by either the P-5 
collectively or by the United States as the sole great power in alliance 
with other P-5 members. That question goes to whether the Council’s 
decision making is so dominated by any or all of the P-5 that 
significant decisions, especially under Chapter VII, can best be 
 
47. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. 
of the Secretary-General, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
48. U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General, July 25, 2012, U.N. Doc 
A/66/874-S/2012/578; GAOR, 66th Sess., (2012) 
49. “On December 21, 1988, Pan American Flight 103, on its way to New 
York's John F. Kennedy Airport, exploded over Lockerbie, a town in southern 
Scotland. All 259 passengers on board were killed. Eleven Lockerbie residents also 
were killed as the shattered civilian carrier crashed to the ground.” Scott S. Evans, 
The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review and 
the Political Question Doctrine, 18 MD. J. INT’L. L. & TRADE 21, 27 (1994) 
(footnotes omitted). 
50. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention 
Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 
Provisional Measure, 1992 I.C.J. 114, 127 (Apr. 14). 
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understood as consistently implementing the national foreign policy 
and security goals of one or more P-5 Members, using international 
law under the Charter as its vehicle, and not as the exercise of lawful 
global collective authority to use force within the world community. 
The collective P-5 drive to intervene in the Southern Tier, through the 
vehicle of international law and the Charter, has seemingly become 
so determined and intense that it overwhelms the normal issues about 
the interplay of P-5 foreign policy and the obligations of each such 
country in the Council.   
 The corruption here is of the very notion of collective authority 
under modern international law. The masquerade of national power 
and aims being cloaked by the forms of collective decision making, 
to reach public conclusions of legality of military and other strategies 
against target states, only reaffirms the corruption. Such corruption 
destroys this vital global safeguard against arbitrary military force. 
Notions of collective authority were evolved over more than a 
century to create such safeguards and to further guard against 
international legal prescription governing critical values being 
corrupted at the core of the authorizing process by the cloaked aims 
of unilateral national power.51 
 Further, this corruption raises even more profound questions. As 
the Council is corrupted by P-5 foreign policy aims, we must know 
that those aims cannot be understood apart from the following: these 
states’ active shaping of the legal history of international law, the 
global North/South domination/subordination narrative, and the 
continuing narratives of colonialist and neo-colonial aims and 
policies being extended from the era of legal colonialism by policies 
and actions of the same now ex-metropolitan states towards the same 
territories of their ex-colonies and subordinated peoples. Further, they 
cannot be understood apart from continuing aims to extend control 
under international law from the North into the South to not only 
protect foreign investments, secure resources for their national needs, 
and protect their exclusive security claims. Equally, the North uses 
that lawful control to deflect accountability for global problems, 
inequities, and crimes from North to South, and to generally block 
 
51. See generally JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS 
LAW-MAKERS (2005) (discussing the evolution of international organizations and 
the treaty making process). 
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that accountability from being returned to the North.   
 Their foreign policy aims in the Council cannot be understood 
apart from their roles in the rise of international human rights law, 
from their early, commendable (if cold-war laced), general fostering 
of states’ obligations to protect and extend the growing list of 
international human rights of individual persons, to their retreat in 
suspicion and paranoia—factual, doctrinal, and theoretical—from the 
effective enforcement of these rights in their own and other 
jurisdictions as they collided with their national prerogatives and 
traditions of “othering” foreign peoples. Moreover, this corruption is 
not addressed by proposals for Security Council procedural reforms 
towards a duty to decide or explain, such as those made by Professor 
Spain, though such reforms might provide more grounds for Council 
ultra vires issues under the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.52 
 Permanent Members’ Council aims cannot be understood apart 
from their behaviors and public perspectives attempting to use the 
human rights process to continue the Northern colonial civilizing 
mission towards Southern peoples, as shown by Makau Mutua,53 by 
favoring doctrines and interpretations urging those peoples to be 
ashamed of their own cultures in favor of neo-liberal principles 
friendly to foreign investment being labeled as “democracy,” and by 
finding jurisprudential excuses to undermine the legal authority of 
essential economic, social, and cultural rights.54 They cannot be 
understood apart from their general opposition to obligations of 
reparations for past colonial and racial wrongs to oppressed southern 
peoples, which were so clearly sponsored, financed, and largely 
implemented by Northern metropolitans, beginning with the 
 
52. Anna Spain, The U.N. Security Council's Duty to Decide, 4 HARV. NAT'L 
SEC. J. 320, 320 (2013). 
53. See Makau Mutua, The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALISM 51, 61 (András 
Sajó ed., 2004) (“International human rights fall within the historical continuum of 
the European colonial project in which whites pose as the saviors of a benighted 
and savage non-European world.”). 
54. Henry Richardson III, Patrolling the Resource Transfer Frontier: 
Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court’s Contributions to 
International Justice, 9 AFR. STUD. Q., Fall 2007, at 81, 82–83 (discussing the 
South African Court's response to dominant Northern Tier limiting interpretations 
of economic human rights.). 
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international slave trade.55  
 These aims, finally, cannot be understood apart from the 
international legal history of permissible doctrines of diplomatic, 
ideological, economic, and military intervention, from legal 
colonialism forward, being evolved to legalize the coercion of 
Southern Tier political cooperation and their resources, plus to force 
their recognition of Northern hegemonic authority, and the 
superiority of Northern sovereign state authority over Southern 
sovereign state authority.  And not only is the Council’s collective 
authority used to certify the legality of Northern jus ad bellum 
intervention actions, but also often after the fact to certify the jus in 
bello legalities of the same actions as they move into a later stage. 
The latter occurs even when the Council manages, by a P-5 split, to 
retain and exercise truly collective authority to refuse to authorize a 
clearly illegal intervention, such as the 2003 invasion and conquest 
by the United States of Iraq that was refused under Resolution 
1441.56 There, a basic question was whether the United States was 
guilty of the crime of aggressive war and colonial conquest.57 
Security Council resolutions beginning almost immediately after the 
invasion constructed a fig-leaf for the United States against such 
crimes by, in its quasi-judicial role, finding that Iraq retained its 
sovereignty and was not reduced to a colony, notwithstanding the 
total destruction of its government by the United States, the complete 
military occupation of its entire territory, and the U.S. construction of 
several years of occupation regimes synonymous with American 
goals and policies.58  
 So, if the Security Council is corrupted at the very heart of its 
collective authority under the Charter by the domination aims of its 
 
55. See 14 Caribbean Nations Sue European Countries for Slavery 
Reparations, AL JAZEERA AM. (Sept. 27, 2013, 7:42 PM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/20 
13/9/27/14-caribbean-nationssueeuropeancountriesforreparationsoverslaver.html 
(describing Caribbean nations’ recent lawsuit seeking reparations from European 
powers for their role in the Atlantic slave trade). 
56. Richardson, supra note 44, at 53.  
57. Id. at 65 
58. 104 AISL Porc. 214 (2011). S.C. Res. 1511, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 
(Oct. 16, 2003). 
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Permanent Members, we must consider alternatives for governing the 
legality of military intervention, particularly as such intervention 
tends to be planned and launched in the North and targeted, 
implemented, and pushed towards Northern- approved consequences 
in the South. Even if we have no immediate formal constitutive 
alternative to the Council under the Charter, we must consider, even 
if only to accurately assess the costs, whether it is wise and equitable 
policy in the progressive development of international law to 
continue to funnel collective authority decisions about such 
interventions through this body, especially under those conditions of 
greatest potential human rights tragedy and need.   
 It might be the better global policy to, first, continue present 
trends of interpretation under Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter to 
widen the competence of regional organizations vis-a-vis the Security 
Council to authorize peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations 
for assisting regional states and peoples.59 And second, to now adjust 
 
59. Articles 52 and 53 of the U.N. Charter state: 
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional 
action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 2. The 
Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting 
such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local 
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies 
before referring them to the Security Council. 3. The Security Council shall 
encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such 
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of 
the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. 4. This Article 
in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35. 
U.N. Charter art. 52. 
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception 
of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, 
provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed 
against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such 
time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be 
charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a 
state. 2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to 
any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any 
signatory of the present Charter. 
U.N. Charter art. 53; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
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the legal balance between the Council and regional organizations on 
authorizing “enforcement actions” under Article 53, towards 
confirming regional authority to initially authorize such actions, 
particularly in providing needed emergency responses to imminent 
human rights catastrophes in a regional state, whether or not such 
response is invited by that government.  In practice, except for 
Kosovo, there has been either ex ante or post hoc Security Council 
action that implied approval for such regional interventions, even 
regarding the ECOWAS intervention led by Nigeria into Liberia and 
Sierra Leone.60 However, an African Union Treaty provision (Article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act) seems to enable the African Union to 
authorize enforcement actions independently of the Security 
Council.61 Its enactment can be understood as a direct response to UN 
inaction on the Rwanda genocide.62 
 For emergency responses to impending human rights 
catastrophes, Article 53 needs to be interpreted towards the legality 
of such operations, especially where the Security Council has not or 
cannot act timely. As we see, the policy aim of giving the Council the 
sole Charter competence to authorize enforcement actions in the 
world community vis-a-vis regional organizations, a debate which 
arose in the San Francisco Conference, is now, due to the corruption 
of the Council, increasingly a problem. Not only do P-5 veto battles 
often prevent the Council from making timely authorizing decisions 
in urgent situations, but the racialized biases that the Permanent 
Members bring to questions of intervention in the Southern Tier risk 
insufficient strategies and neo-colonial responses when the Council 
does exercise collective authority. One possible interpretative remedy 
would be to confirm the initial competence of regional organizations 
to authorize enforcement actions in regional situations of imminent 
human rights catastrophe, under a presumption of Council approval 
of such emergency actions, even if the regional organization thus 
shares with the Council the authority to infringe Article 2(4) of the 
 
COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 1496–1505. 
60. Id. at 1487–90. 
61. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), Jul. 11, 2000, 2158 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
62. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45, 
at 1490–93.  
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Charter.63 The burden would then be on the Council and the P-5 to 
subsequently disown the regional action.  
  We must further consider whether it is the best international 
legal policy to continue the evolution of R2P as a legal doctrine 
through invocations and implementation through the Security 
Council, following its first invocation in the Libyan situation.64 Or, 
whether R2P should desirably continue to evolve  through regional 
organizational decision-making as the overall less-corrupt sources of 
collective authority. The corruption of the Security Council makes it 
impossible to wait for effective and just Security Council reform in 
order to interpret international law to implement more just and 
equitable actions of military intervention into the Southern Tier. 
Other sources of collective authority, which promise better 
safeguards against dominating and racializing national state behavior 
relative to decisions about military intervention, must be found. 
VI. R2P 
 This now brings us to the bundle of issues and emerging norms 
known as Responsibility to Protect (R2P), already mentioned. As an 
emerging legal norm of permissibility for outside states to intervene 
in a state in the midst of or imminently facing tragic violations of the 
human rights of its citizens, under collective authority or unilateral 
obligation, there is much confusion here. And we must note that R2P 
comprises claims and expectations that Northern Tier states will 
generally, even if not exclusively, be intervening in Southern Tier 
states under the rubric of preventing human rights tragedies. There 
are no expectations that, for example, Nigeria will be intervening in 
Spain under African Union authority or unilaterally to prevent major 
rights crimes towards the Basque people, or that the United States 
will be intervening in Australia to remedy racial tragedies against 
Aboriginal peoples.   
 That Northern states generally have superior resources to project 
military force in the implementation of global authority compared to 
Southern states only sharpens, without resolving, R2P issues. It 
cannot be a prong of neutral analysis, particularly when this capacity 
is linked with Northern Tier control or near control over key 
international organizational processes and decisions authorizing the 
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lawful use of force, beginning with the UN Security Council.  Thus, 
R2P risks providing another doctrinal framework for the North to 
leverage and control decisions about using force or other coercion to 
enforce human rights law, and then to exercise additional leverage to 
secure what Southern agreement is possible in order to claim global 
legitimacy. This risk must be compared to the goal of the Northern 
and Southern Tier evolving to share equal authority to determine 
lawful use of force in particular situations, whether in Northern or 
Southern States, and to determine liability for such human rights 
violations. 
 We must also step back and understand the R2P doctrine as an 
historical successor to the old doctrine of humanitarian intervention: 
quite possibly another North to South projection of international legal 
authority. It comprises legal permission to intervene to rescue and 
protect local endangered persons.65 However, there is a doctrinal 
distinction.  R2P is grounded on the rights of people to be protected 
from human rights tragedy, while the old abused humanitarian 
intervention was grounded on one state’s right to intervene in 
another.66  We do not yet know if the North/South R2P consequences 
will be more globally equitable, and the recent Libyan situation 
through the Security Council invoking R2P is not encouraging.67 
 Regarding humanitarian intervention, we should briefly recall 
various claims about its legality under the UN Charter, because 
similar issues must be resolved about the use of at least unilateral 
military force under R2P, also under the Charter. Proponents of 
humanitarian intervention argued it as a doctrine of customary 
international law, which the Charter did not abrogate—a customary 
river running beneath the Charter, as indeed the ICJ holding in 
 
65. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. 
of the Secretary General, ¶ 11(c), U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
66. Id. ¶ 7. 
67. The Security Council authorized military action by States, which just 
happen to be ex-colonial states of Libya prior to its independence, and pursuant to 
the beginning of military conflict ignored all Africa attempts to find a more 
peaceful ending to the conflict. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, at 4 
(Mar. 17, 2011). And, there has been a decided lack of success in applying the 
same R2P principles to the massive deaths and oppression by Syrian government 
against its people. See David Rieff, Op-Ed., R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Nicaragua v. U.S. permits.68 Specifically, unilateral humanitarian 
intervention represented a use of nonconsensual military force 
intervening in a target state.69 Let us recall the Charter goals to 
change international law to limit permissible uses of force by a state 
to (1) use in self defense under Article 51, which does to a degree 
incorporate self defense custom as well as anticipatory self defense 
with the limits of the Caroline case, but not pre-emptive self-defense, 
and (2) that military force authorized by Security Council decision. 
The Charter aim was to abolish war as authorization for military 
force and channel unilateral permissibility into a single (widening) 
grant of international constitutive authority. Unilateral force 
otherwise was to be illegal, including under Article 2(4) for violating 
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, contrary to 
UN Purposes and Principles.70 
 The issue becomes whether and on what legal basis can we add 
R2P as a unilateral, or non-Security Council-authorized use of force, 
as a new and additional permission under the Charter, not amounting 
to self defense, to use unilateral force within a foreign sovereign 
state. The customary law argument for R2P does not apply, at least 
not yet, and not without more clarified evidence of a global 
consensus. Is it wise to then claim that a second, newer customary 
river permitting unilateral force runs beneath the Charter, thus 
opening the door to defining a third and fourth such rivers? This 
threatens to become a recipe for expanding the permissibility for 
national state military force to pre-Charter levels addressing mere 
foreign policy objectives. It would compromise the foundational aim 
of international law to reduce military conflict both among and within 
states. And given that the majority of the 30 or so states which have 
effective capacities to project military force well beyond their borders 
lie in the Northern Tier, this is a recipe for expanding permissible 
Northern intervention into and onto Southern peoples. 
Taking a moment to reflect on the above, let me address Rwanda 
in the ambiguous R2P narrative. 
 
68. Nicaragua, supra note 14, at 94–95. 
69. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. 
J. INT’L. L. 107, 111 (2006). 
70. DANISH INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 81 (1999), available at 
http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publ 
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A. Rwanda 
 A proposed doctrine of R2P rose into international community 
expectations following the Rwanda genocide. The failure of the 
Arusha Accords in 1992-93, leading to that tragedy, relative to the 
collectively authorized peacekeeping effort by the UN Security 
Council, demonstrates that the opportunity of existing UN 
peacekeeping military forces in Rwanda, to halt or mitigate the 
predicted, oncoming, planned, and directed genocide, was not taken 
because of the European (Belgian) and Security Council P-5-imposed 
great reduction of those forces, to the point of ineffectiveness.71 Thus, 
Rwanda shows that if Security Council-authorized collective 
authority is the preferred legal mode of implementation of R2P, 
moving as it would from North to South, the Council cannot be 
depended on to overcome the foreign policy interests (led by the 
United States) of the P-5 and enable itself as a law-giver to 
effectively decide on sufficiently strong and timely military force 
(here largely already in the country) to halt a planned and directed 
genocide. The Council’s response was indeed to weaken such forces 
and make it clear that they were not to interfere. A stronger force 
deployed could have mitigated or prevented the killing of up to 1 
million civilians. 
 This failure of the Northern-controlled response to this genocide, 
in the Council as the arena of Northern decisional and international 
legal preference, indicates, first, that the P-5 retain the deficits within 
the Council of racialized international law towards the Southern Tier, 
notwithstanding the most serious crimes converging with Northern 
availability of military capacity. Second, it indicates that this P-5/UN 
failure in the quintessential R2P situation frames anew the issue of 
the legality of unilateral intervention in an imminent danger R2P 
situation. This is particularly so, since the P-5/UN response in 
Rwanda, at the critical point, arguably violated the Purposes and 
Principles of the UN Charter by deliberately neutering the Council 
and allowing a predicted genocide. 
 
71. U.N. S.C. Rep. of Secretary-General, July 4, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 
GAOR, 64th Sess. (2010); U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 15, 1999 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 37, 
U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999). 
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 Thus, this history challenges the asserted policy preference of 
the Council as the primary R2P lawgiver regarding collective 
authority to protect people facing human rights catastrophes. The 
challenge is not resolved by the Libyan action based on the Council’s 
interpretation of R2P, because clearly the majority of P-5 foreign 
policy interests favored getting rid of Ghaddafi at the first 
opportunity,72 and if by collective authorization, so much the better. 
The subsequent apologies of several Northern and UN 
international leaders, who publicly wished ex post that they had done 
more, in the face of their own clear realistic capacity to act, to 
interrupt or perhaps even prevent that horrific Rwanda genocidal 
program, rang somewhat hollow.73 But they did lead to proposals for 
an obligatory doctrine of intervention binding on states in a position 
to do so, to halt ongoing or impending human rights atrocities (and 
not lesser degrees of violation, however understood). Various 
proposals followed in the UN system. But fairly quickly this version 
of R2P was challenged by the issue of whether such intervention to 
prevent human rights atrocities must only lie under some collective 
exercise of authority, desirably the UN Security Council, but perhaps 
as in Africa for Sierra Leone, by regional authority. These 
ambiguities were debated to and fro, until the Libyan question before 
the Security Council in 2011. There, the Council, acting under 
Chapter VII authority and under its quasi-judicial authority, 
prescribed, in finding Libyan government actions to be a threat to 
international peace and security, that government’s duty under 
international law to protect its citizens and refrain from causing them 
deadly harm. It described that duty as Responsibility to Protect.74  
Thus, this doctrine became a standing duty of state governments to 
refrain from deadly harm to their citizens, enforceable by Security 
Council collective authorization of outside state military intervention 
under the Charter.   
R2P was thus narrowed from its original unilateral intervention 
 
72. See Barack Obama, David Cameron & Nicolas Sarkozy, Op-Ed., Libya’s 
Pathway to Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/ 
15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html (“[A]ny deal that leaves [Ghaddafi] in power 
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73. See Jason A. Edwards, The Mission of Healing: Kofi Annan’s Failed 
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context. The issue of the critical importance of deployment in time to 
prevent a human catastrophe was submerged in favor of debate and 
decision by the Northern-controlled Security Council, and the risk 
was added of one or more Permanent Member vetoes abrogating any 
intervention, no matter how horrific the facts on the ground. It is true 
that R2P has now been quasi-judicially prescribed by the Council as a 
doctrinal duty on all state governments to refrain from deadly harm to 
their citizens, particularly to ensure their own regime survival. But 
now we see that this prescription is in danger of becoming sui generis 
and attracting no precedential authority, as the Security Council both 
refuses and may be unable to apply it to other similar, or worse 
situations, as is now the case with Syria.75 The R2P doctrine may be 
available to levy against the Assad regime, but any intervention to 
prevent or mitigate the carnage on the ground against Syrian citizens 
is bottled up in the narrowness of vetoes and post-Libyan 
international politics. Where, even in theory, do we go from here? 
VII. A FINAL PROPOSAL 
 I will conclude with a proposal regarding unilateral military 
intervention. 
 In the recent Libyan situation, R2P was prescribed by the 
Security Council as a duty on all states to protect their citizens from 
state-sponsored harm and destruction, and its violation was invoked 
by the Council as a threat to international peace and security by the 
Libyan government.76 But that invocation was inextricable from the 
proto-colonial narrative running through the Security Council 
process. Military force was authorized against Libya to be carried out 
by three ex-colonial metropolitans (Italians, British, French) of 
Libyan territory when it was a colony, through Council decision 
making where at least three of the P-5 states had their own long-
standing foreign policy reasons for removing Ghaddafi as a national 
leader.77 African initiatives for a more negotiated approach to the 
 
75. Rieff, supra note 67. 
76. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, at 1–2  (Mar. 17, 2011). 
77. See Ewen MacAskill, Obama Hails Death of Muammar Gaddafi as 
Foreign Policy Success, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2011, 4:13 PM), 
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situation were roundly rebuffed, while the Arab League gave the 
Council reluctant support, which was quickly claimed in Northern 
narratives to legitimize the entire operation.78 
 However, answering the legal challenge of those situations 
where an immediate military response to an imminent human rights 
catastrophe may well necessarily have to be, in the short term, a 
unilateral military response (as would have likely been the case in 
Rwanda), seems to involve R2P as an emerging international legal 
doctrine that would give a limited unilateral legal permission to use 
military force to avoid an human rights catastrophe.   
 The question then becomes: what changes can be made to 
mitigate the racializing dangers of R2P and its projected 
implementation in this regard, as between the Northern and Southern 
Tiers? There is a considerable process of legal development in the 
United Nations, particularly involving the General Assembly and the 
Office of the Secretary-General, focused on R2P as an emerging legal 
doctrine. One notable outcome is the limitation of the coverage of the 
doctrine to situations involving genocide and other stated 
international crimes.79  We can ask whether this limitation will help 
curtail potential North to South racializing abuses under R2P, as well 
as help universalize the R2P norm of preventing human rights 
catastrophes in both the Northern and the Southern Tier. 
 But a more immediate task in this regard is to separate decisions 
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about military action by Northern officials from assessments and 
recognition of the imminence of a human rights catastrophe in a 
particular state or situation. In other words, we must ensure the 
authority of the Caroline requirement of imminence as a permissive 
condition to use military force.80 This task particularly arises around 
the current Security Council-related issues of, first, the “authority” of 
a Security Council Chapter VII veto blocking military or other 
Council action following discussion of a situation threatening 
international peace and security, where there were either strong 
expectations by key P-5 Members of Council authorization in which 
they would play a key role, or strong international community 
expectations that the Council should authorize forceful action.   Much 
interpretation has arisen about the “permission” given by a Council 
veto for action nonetheless, by, for example, “coalitions of the 
willing” organized by the strength and will of the United States for 
action, such as in Iraq in 2003.   
 Similarly, following Kosovo and NATO action lacking Council 
approval, there followed scholarly interpretations that the military 
action was “illegal but legitimate.”81 The latter bifurcation, while 
understandable, raised more unanswered issues about interpreting 
both the UN Charter and general international law. Thus, the question 
becomes that of regulating the determination of one or more P-5 
members and other states who were primed for their own military 
action and wished it to be collectively authorized, but it was not, and 
therefore they remained determined and rationalized to carry it 
through nonetheless. The companion question is that of regulating 
state and public international demands for military action considered 
“legitimate” to forestall a human rights tragedy, but with collective 
authorization blocked by the wrong-headed veto “failure” of the 
Council. 
 
80. See John Moore, The Caroline, in 3 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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The correlative questions posit that, first, the obligation to rescue 
people from human catastrophes must take legal priority over 
blocking geopolitical and national governmental claims of 
impossibility of meaningful response. And second, that the national 
deployment of military force for other purposes beyond the above 
more or less credible self-defense, not validly authorized under 
international law, must be prohibited by law to the extent possible. 
Such a prohibition will help mitigate the continuing danger of 
Northern military intervention being justified, for other national 
policy objectives, by claims of that state(s) acting to protect human 
rights in a target Southern state. 
 To address both of these latter questions, I propose that 
dedicated authority to make assessments and formally certify the 
imminence of a human rights catastrophe anywhere in the world 
community—and only to publicly broadcast and recognize the 
imminence of such impending horrors—be lodged in the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as it is linked to 
the Secretary-General. The DPKO already possesses clear capacity 
towards such global monitoring, in its responsibilities to do 
assessments of threatening conflicts in advance of forthcoming 
Security Council discussion, in providing the Secretary-General with 
necessary Council information, as well as in assessing the 
requirements of implementing a peacekeeping operation authorized 
by the Council.82 Part of this process already is the convoking by the 
Secretary-General, independently of the Security Council and its 
mandates, a “Strategic Assessment” of impending situations that 
includes relevant resources and information from elsewhere in the 
UN Secretariat, and which may be followed by the dispatch of special 
envoys for further assessment of the situation.83 All of this strongly 
suggests, especially with additional resources, that the DPKO in 
conjunction with the Secretary-General, and upon his authority, could 
perform the global monitoring necessary to timely and loudly 
publicly proclaim the imminence of a human rights catastrophe 
arising anywhere in the world community, especially a planned and 
directed genocide or other R2P-stated international crimes. It further 
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suggests that this Department is sufficiently independent of undue 
corrupting pressures by Member states for it to do this critically 
important job.   
 However, now the DPKO must ensure that its monitoring and 
assessment function is equally extended to the Northern Tier, 
following the precedent through the UN Human Rights Council of 
the Universal Periodic Review of the internal human rights 
conditions of all states, and the growing precedents of UN human 
rights reports for conditions in the United States and elsewhere in the 
North. This extension is critical to mitigate the racializing of the R2P 
process.   
 Operationally, the DPKO under this proposal—having hopefully 
learned its lessons since Rwanda—would certify, where no other 
timely options through the United Nations or elsewhere could be 
mobilized, that a human rights catastrophe was imminent in a 
particular state and that its government was unwilling or unable to 
protectively respond. This would be a loud, global certification, 
perhaps analogous to a global imminent tsunami warning with the 
full weight of the Secretary-General behind it. Only upon that 
certification of imminence of an human rights catastrophe featuring 
international crimes would any unilateral national state or states, in a 
position to timely and appropriately deploy rights-protective military 
force to the designated state, acquire the legal authority to so 
intervene for the sole purpose of preventing or mitigating the rights 
catastrophe until further international assistance could arrive 
(including that authorized by the Council or a regional organization).  
 Such DPKO certification of imminence would only be a pre-
condition, and itself would create no right or duty on states to 
respond. However, in addition to the halting of R2P international 
crimes already having been confirmed as an obligation erga omnes, 
military and territorial factors plus the contextual relationship of the 
unilateral actor(s) to the targeted territory and its people, would shape 
the unilateral state’s duty to act to mitigate or prevent the impending 
catastrophic crimes. Should that state now fail to respond where its 
capacity to do so is apparent, global demands would hopefully arise 
for it to immediately justify its refusing its duty to protect those 
gravely endangered people on behalf of the international community. 
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 Those states responding would be bound by international 
humanitarian law where there is military conflict, and also by 
international human rights law where applicable. An important part 
of their global accountability would be an assessment of the strategies 
and aims of their military deployments. The latter must be tailored for 
preventing a human rights catastrophe and immediately delivering the 
humanitarian assistance and protection of local people directly 
implied, and not for prevailing in a civil war and shaping the 
governance of the country for other ends. Such military intervention 
must be then tailored to withdraw once the catastrophe is prevented 
and other suitable international assistance arrives. 
 To define the legal basis for any country using unilateral force 
under this proposal requires us to recall that the legal norm of R2P 
emphasizes the needs of the victims to be protected, rather than an 
alleged right to intervention. We must address the issue of unilateral 
military responses to claimed human rights catastrophes for at least 
three reasons: (1) because of the inevitability that some states will 
sometimes claim a right to do so, in relation or not to Security 
Council action, and therefore the need for better international legal 
regulation of this issue; (2) the history of collective authorization for 
emergency human rights responses being often that of such 
authorization coming, if at all, quite late to actually protect the 
potential victims on the ground, or not coming at all because of P-5 
conflicting politics and racializing aims blocking Security Council 
action under Chapter VII, in addition to similar possible delays in 
regional organizations; and (3) sometimes, as rarely and accurately 
judged as possible, timely properly deployed military action even by 
a single state even with its inherent violence and other risk of abuse, 
is the only effective first-stage hope for threatened people in an R2P 
situation.   There are already proposals being made in the legal 
relationship between the Council under Chapter VII and regional 
organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter for carving out 
exceptions for regional military action in emergency R2P situations.84 
This proposal advocates the acceleration of that process, with the 
inclusion of these DPKO-certified conditions and safeguards.    
 I have previously suggested that regional organizations might 
authorize enforcement action in emergency R2P situations under a 
presumption of post hoc Security Council approval. I now expand 
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that recommendation to the regional level, to cover presumptive 
regional authorization—if it is not given timely per the DPKO 
certification of imminence—for a single or a few states in a position 
for an immediate properly-deployed military response for R2P 
prevention. They would exercise their duty to unilaterally act to 
prevent a criminal catastrophe.  The burden would be, first, on the 
regional organization to disown, if it wishes, the unilateral R2P 
protective mission, and then on the Security Council. I suggest that 
disowning such actions that are uniquely triggered by DPKO 
certifications of imminence, that are publicly and properly deployed 
for only that purpose, and whose deployment quickly includes 
publicized goals, arrangements, and timetables for military action and 
then withdrawal from the territory after averting or mitigating a 
catastrophe, would rarely happen. Thus, the legal basis for unilateral 
action would primarily rest on the emerging authority of regional 
organizations to order enforcement actions only in emergency R2P 
situations, and the implied regional authorization to those unilateral 
state actors deploying military force subsequent to DPKO 
certifications of imminence. Any implied Security Council approval 
post hoc would only support that legality.   
 More risky arguments might also be made on the legality of this 
emergency, unilateral R2P action based on General Assembly or 
other appropriate process of limited re-interpretation of Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter that this unilateral use of force against a designated 
state for this R2P purpose, and only under these DPKO-certified 
conditions and safeguards, presumptively does not constitute a threat 
to the territorial integrity or the political independence of the 
intervened-in state. Such tightly defined action upholds Charter 
human rights obligations, constitutes a valid emergency exception 
absent Security Council action not otherwise addressed by the 
Charter, and therefore constitutes a lawful use of limited unilateral 
force under the UN Charter. Professor D’Amato has shown how the 
Charter travaux support such an interpretation of Article 2(4).85    
 
85. Anthony D’Amato, The Meaning of Article 2(4) in the U.N. Charter 15 
(Northwestern Pub. Law and Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 13-30, 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.comabstract=2321806. See also Robert F. Turner, 
International Law Studies, Vol.67, Chapter III, State Sovereignty, International 
Law, and the Use of Force in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern 
World 48, 65; Barry M. Benjamin, "Unilateral Humanitarian Interventions: 
2014]    CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION 49 
 All in all, this proposed legal basis for unilateral R2P DPKO-
certified emergency military intervention, and for regional 
organizations authorizing enforcement action for the same purpose, 
represents more desirable international community policy, than the 
current Northern-led debates on the authority to act militarily 
conferred by a Security Council veto-refusal of Chapter VII decisions 
to authorize protective military action, and than the dilemma for 
international lawyers following Kosovo of designating emergency 
catastrophe-mitigating regional action absent Council authorization 
as “illegal but legitimate.” 
 Again, the DPKO and the Secretary General must be equally 
prepared and willing to give such global certifications of imminence 
to situations in the Northern Tier where its timely assessment 
requires. If no outside military forces respond, the threatened people 
within a Northern state will at least gain some added local protection, 
plus other possible globally mobilized strategies of non-military 
intervention, from this special global spotlight focused on their 
oppression. 
CONCLUSION 
 It is an open question whether international law will develop to 
only bless current patterns of power regarding North to South 
practices of intervention, or whether better international law will 
resolve this challenge through a less racialized process. The power of 
human rights is hopeful, but insufficient without more incorporation 
of the lessons of the Decolonization Movement, and without R2P 
successfully emerging as a non-racialized norm of protection in 
imminently catastrophic situations. The United Nations, in spite of 
the Security Council in its current process, must play an important, 
safeguarding role.  I always hold out hope for better international 
law. 
Thank you. 
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